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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U ta.h
GERTRUDE GIBBS, LYNN P.
GIBBS and GAYE GIBBS SMITH,

Plaintiffs a.nd Appellants,
-vs.-

Civil No. 7710

BLUE CAB, INC., a corporation,

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from the Second Judicial District Court of
the State of Utah
Honorable Charles G. Cowley, Judge

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the morning of the 24th day of November, 1948,
about 6 :40 A.M., one of the defendant's taxicabs driven
by one Ronald D. Mullen, its agent, was proceeding
easterly on 23rd Street in Ogden, Utah, at a rate of speed
between 20 and 25 miles per hour ( TR-55). The street
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was dmnp and the morning was dark and rainy (TR-55).
As the taxicah came to the intersection of 23rd Street and
Jefferson Avenue the driver, Ronald D. lVIullen, observed
the front wheel of a bicycle in his lef~ front headlight
approximately ten to fifteen feet ahead of the taxicab
( TR-55, 56). r_rhe taxicab struck the bicycle and one F.
Parley Gibbs in the southwest quadrant of the intersection, and the bicycle and taxicab came to rest easterly
of the area of impact (Stipulated,Diagram). The intersection was lighted on the north-east corner by a street
lmnp (Stipulated Diagram). After the i:r~pact F. Parley
Gibbs, wheeled his bicycle northward on Jefferson Avenue (TR-52). The taxicab then proceeded one-half block
east on 23rd Street and picked up a passenger (TR-58).
The taxi-driver then and there admitted to the passenger
that he did not see l\Ir. Gibbs until he hit him, and that
his vision was obscured (TR-7).
F. Parley Gibbs died as a result of this collision.
There is absolutely no evidence in the record as to the
deceased's conduct prior to the collision in question.
There is no evidence in the record regarding which direction the deceased was moving prior to the impact, or
whether he was riding his bicycle or merely pushing it
or standing still in the intersection.
The only heirs of F. Parley Gibbs brought this action against the defendant to recover damages for his
wrongful death. The case was tried before a jury, and
the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant
against the plaintiffs upon the ground that deceased

4
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was contributorily negligent as a nmtter of law in failing
to keep a proper lookout prior to the collision (TR-89,
90).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A VERDICT AGAINST PLAINTIFFS UPON THE GROUND THAT
DECEASED WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW, IN THAT DECEASED WAS PRESUMED
TO HAVE BEEN ACTING WITH DUE CARE, AND SAID
PRESUMPTION WAS NOT OVERCOME.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A VERDICT AGAINST PLAINTIFFS UPON -THE GROUND THAT
DECEASED WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW, IN THAT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A
VERDICT AGAINST PLAINTIFFS UPON THE GROUND
THAT DECEASED WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW, AS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER
OR NO DECEASED'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, IF
ANY, PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTED TO HIS DEATH
WAS AN ISSUE OF FACT FOR THE JURY.

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A VERDICT AGAINST PLAINTIFFS UPON THE GROUND THAT
DECEASED \VAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW, IN THAT DECEASED WAS PRESUMED
TO H~VE BEEN ACTING WITH DUE CARE, AND SAID
PRESUMPTION WAS NOT OVERCOME.

5
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The question to be detennined in deciding this point
rs: Vvas there sufficient evidence introduced to show
decedent was contributorily negligent ati a matter of law?
Let us review such evidence as shown by the record.
The only testimony regarding decedent's conduct
was given by the driver of respondent's vehicle. His
testimony was that decedent's bike was first seen in
his left front headlight (TR-55 and 61) son1e 10 feet to
15 feet away ('rR-60), and that at no time did he see the
decedent prior to hiting hirn ('~rR-58), and that the front
wheel of the bike was turned in a southeasterly direction
(TR-62) or very nearly parallel to respondent's vehicle
(TR-62). rrhis testimony of respondent's agent, along
with the physical evidence (Stipulated Diagram) are all
that the Court can consider in overcoming the presumption of due care. It should be noted that there is no
evidence showing what the decedent was doing at the time
of impact; whether he was mounted upon his bike or
afoot; whether he was stopped or rnoving in a forward
direction.
Therefore, we must ask ourselves: Is the testimony
that the front wheel of a bike is seen and struck in the
center of an intersection sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of due cure to which the decedent
was entitled and hold that he was negligent as a matter
of law? It is the contention of the appellant that this is
not sufficient evidence to overcon1e such presumption
and the following cases are cited in support of such con6
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tention. In the recent ease of Jfingus v. Ollson, (Utah1949), 201 Pac. :!nd 495, the decedent, a pedestrian, was

killed while crossing 13th East Street on Westminster
~\venue in Salt Lake City at night-thne. The Court ruled
that the presun1ption of due care was overcome because
of concrete testi1nony by the decedent's wife, who was
walking with hhn when he was struck, to the effect that
decedent failed to look in any direction before stepping
into the street. The concurring opinion says: (Page 499)
"Of course, if there was a complete absence
of evidence as to whether he took any precautions
to avoid the accident, then the law creates a presumption that he took reasonable precautions for
his own safety and that he was injured in spite
of such precautions.
.. But here there was evidence from which the
jury could reasonably find that he took no precaution for his own safety, and on the production
of such evidence the presumption disappears from
the case and the question must be determined frmn
the evidence. Of course the facts upon which the
presu'mption is based are still in evidence and if
they have a logical tendency to prove that the
decedent used reasonable care for his own safety,
they may be considered in determining the question." (Italics added).
In another recent decision, Compton et al v. Ogden
Union Ry. & Depot Company, (Utah-1951), 235 Pac. 2nd
515, the decedent was killed when struck by defendant's
engine in its yard at Ogden, Utah. The trial court entered
7
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judgment of dismissal at conclusion of plaintiff's case.
In this case, decedent was walking with a con1panion who
accounted for all her rnovements immediately prior to,
and at the time she was struck.
The court in its opinion said that there is a strong
presun1ption based on the instinct of self-preservation
that the deceased was exercising due care for her own
safety and which may take the place of evidence sufficient
to make findings on, in the absence of other evidence.
It then goes on to say:
"The presun1ption is applicable where there
is no evidence as to care used, or perhaps where
the evidence comes frmn an adverse witness who
may be subject to disbelief by the jury, or where
there is sufficient uncertainty in the evidence as to
cast doubt on the testimony."
There are several Utah cases sustaining instructions
that the presun1ption nmst he considered by the jun, in
cases where no witnesses have seen the mishap and physical evidence alone must be relied upon by defendants
to sustain a finding hy the jury of contributory negligence.
In Lewis v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 40 Utah
483, 1:23 Pac. 97, decedent was killed at night at defendant's crossing. No eye witnesses of the accident testified,
and the body was found at the side of defendant's tracks
on the morning following the mishap. Decedent was walk8
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.l

ing when killed, and it was ad1nitted by plaintiff that the
train could have been seen son1e 200 to 250 feet frmn the
crossing. An instruction was given and sustained that it
must be presumed that deceased used due care. The
court states :
"The hnportant question is: does the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable
to respondents, overcome this legal presumption
of ordinary care on the part of Lewis 1 We think
not."
See also Coray v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 111
Utah, 541, 180 Pac. 2nd 542, which is a similar case in
which a switch1nan was killed while on duty and his body
later found lying near the tracks. See also Davis v. Denuer & Rio Grande Western Railway Co., 45 Utah 17, 142
Pac. 705, a case in which the deceased was hit by defendant's train and no witnesses testified regarding the facts
surrounding the mishap. The court in this case gave the
following instructions and it was held proper upon appeal:
"There is a presun1ption of law that every
1nan exercises due care for his own safety when
in a place of danger and that deceased did so at
the time and place when and where he met death,
so that plaintiff was not required to prove affirmatively that deceased looked and listened for the
train, the presumption being that he did so, and
burden on defendant to prove otherwise, which
was bound to establish that fact by a preponderence of the evidence."

9
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In Evans v. Oregon Shortline Ry. Co., 37 Utah 4/31,
108 Pac. 638, decedent was killed while crossing defendant's tracks with tean1 and wagon. The court upon appeal held:

"It is a presumption of law that every man
exercise due care for his own safety when in a
place of danger, and the presumption is that deceased did so when he approached the crossing."
In Clark et al v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 70 Utah 29,
257 Pac. 1050, the lower court directed a verdict for defendant, plaintiffs appealed and the trial court was reversed. Plaintiff brought action to recover for wrongful
death resulting frmn a collision at a public crossing.
There was considerable variance in the testimony of witnesses regarding warnings given by defendant. However, it was determined that visibility was relatively
poor, and a fireman testified he saw decedent's truck
some 125 feet from the crossing; that he supposed that
the driver would stop and let the train go by, but that he
failed to do so and was struck. The court states :
"The burden of proving contributory negligence, of course, was on the defendant. In absence
of evidence, there is a presumption that the deceased looked and listened, and did all that prudence and due care required ...
"The question thus is, does the record conclusively show that deceased failed to look and listen,
and that by looking and listening he could have
discovered the approach of the train in time to
have stopped and let it pass f'
10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The court considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs found the question of contributory negligence to be for the jury and remanded for
rehearing.
In

Baker v.

Savos

et

al,

52

Utah

262,

172 Pac. Pac. 6'7.:2, a child was killed on Redwood Road

near Taylorsville by an overtaking nwtor truck. No witnesses were found and the defendant denied knowledge
of hitting the child. However, the jury basing their decision upon circun1stantial ·evidence found for plaintiff,
and in so doing considered the presmnption of due care
as to the dead child.
There are nurnerous cases in other jurisdictions dealing with this point and the following are leading California decisions.
In Wright v. Sniffin et al, 80 Cal. App. (2d) 358, 181
Pac. 2nd 675, plaintiff's daughter was killed on a bicycle as she turned left into defendant's vehicle without
signaling. The court held:
"In spite of the evidence of the defendants
that N onna failed to give left arm signal or any
warning of her intention to cross the highway,
plaintiff was entitled to the presumption that the
deceased used due care for her own safety. . . .
which created a conflict of evidence regarding
that subject."
Rios v. Bennett, 88 Cal. App. (2d) 919, 200 Pac. 2nd
73, is a case in which decedent was killed by defendant's

11
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vehicle at night as he walked diagonally across the street
out of the pedestrian lane. Witness testified that deceased walked into the path of defendant's vehicle which
witness had seen some 70 to 7;) feet away. rrhe court held
that:
"A presumption existed that a pedestrian
struck. ... by an autornobile used ordinary care
for his own safety and that in doing so he looked
before he stepped out into the street."
The case of Blackm,ore v. Brennan, 43 Cal. App. (2d)
280, 110 Pac. 2nd 723, is another California case of
wrongful death of a rnotorist in an open intersection.
The court in this case said :
"In the absence of evidence overcoming the
presumption it should prevail ... In other words
the jury was told in effect that it must determine
whether sufficient evidence had been adduced to
overcome that presumption."

Duehren v. Stewart, 39 Cal. App. 201, 102 Pac. 2nd
784, is a case in which decedent, a pedestrian, was killed
while crossing in a crosswalk at an intersection. The
mishap occurred at 8 :00 P.:M. Witnesses testified that
decedent walked "pretty fast" and "didn't turn his head
or look in the direction from which they were approaching." The lower court instructed the jury regarding the
presurnption of due care and appellant complained that
it was error to give such instruction since
12
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"Actions of deceased at tilne of accident were
seen and mnounted to contributory negligence as
a matter of law ... that they have (speaking of the
instruc'tions) no place in the record when evidence
clearly demonstrates the action of injured or de~
ceased party.

"It is contended that there is no conflict in
the evidence as to the actions of the deceased frorn
the time he was first observed on the sidewalk
until he was struck; that he stepped down into the
street and walked across the same at a moderate
gait and at no time turned his head to look in the
direction in which oncoming traffic might endanger his safety; that the appellate courts have held
that 'to look and fail to see' what is perfectly obvious and apparent is negligence; that Mr. Watt
testified that he saw the deceased on the sidewalk
before he stepped into the street; that he saw him
step into the street and that he was looking
straight ahead at all times and walking at a
moderate gait; that where all the facts and circumstances were proven, the court was not authorized to cast a presmnption into the scales in favor
of the plaintiff.
"Appellant does not argue that the evidence
does not establish appellant's negligence. The
law gave to the deceased the right of way in a
marked crosswalk. The appellant not only drove
at an excessive rate of speed but passed another
car at the intersection under circumstances where
he could not have seen whether there were pedestrians in the crosswalk or not. That he was not
keeping an accurate or sufficient lookout is conclusively demonstrated by his statement. No witness testifying on behalf of the respondents saw
~fr. Duerhan at all as he approached Hill Street,

13
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nor did any of respondent's witnesses observe him
until he was first seen by l\frs. 'N att some 10 or
15 feet out into the cros~\valk. The presumption
therefore, arose in the absence of evidence on the
subject. There is therefore nothing to call that
presumption to the ath~ntion of the jury unless the
court did instruct them relative to its existence.
"It has been repeatedly held that disputable
presumptions are evidence in a case ... , and such
presumption 1nay be controverted by other evidence .... It has also been repeatedly held that it
is a question for the jury to determine whether the
presumption has been overcome by evidence offered in contradiction thereof. . . . Respondents
produced no evidence to determine what observations :Mr. Duehren n1ade just before he attempted
to cross the street. Appellant offered no evidence
as to whether the deceased looked prior to the
time he stepped off the curb,. (Italics by court).
Respondents were therefore entitled to the presumption above mentioned as their own evidence
was reconcilable with it, and such presumption reInained as evidence in the case until dispelled by
evidence offered in contradiction thereof."
In Greenslitt v. Three Brothers Banking Company,
170 Ore. 345, 133 Pac. 2nd 597, decedent was struck by
defendant's vehicle in daylight when decedent ran diagonally across a highway into the path of a truck. The court
held:
"The evidence tending to show negligence on
his part is not of such conclusive character as to
overcon1e such presurnption as a matter of law.
The issue of contributory negligence was properly
submitted to the jury."
14
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The case of Wiswell v. Shinners, 47 Cal. App. (2d)
156, 117 Pac. 2·nd 677, deals with a pedestrian versus a
motorist. In this case the pedestrian was struck and
killed and there was evidence that he was not in a crosswalk when the accident occurred. At page 680, the Court
says:
"In urging that the direct evidence furnished
by an eye-witness in this case dissipated the presmnptions established by law, respondents fail to
appreciate the limitations upon the power of the
trial court when directing a· verdict as such limitations are laid down in Estate of Flood and Estate
of Lances, supra. Under the familiar rules there
enunciated, when there is a showing on behalf of
the plaintiff of certain facts as in the instant case,
certain physical facts, such as skid marks and
their relation to the point of collision and the point
at which the driver first applied his brakes; the
speed of the automobile; the failure of the driver
to sound his horn or otherwise give warning; the
unobstructed view of deceased on the part of the
driver for some considerable distance; the clearness of the weather and the dryness of the street,
together with the presumptions relied upon; and
when on the other hand, evidence both direct and
circumstantial, favorable to their cause, is introduced by defendants, the latter evidence must be
eliminated from consideration by the court for the
purpose of ruling upon a motion for a directed
verdict.
"We therefore conclude that appellant was entitled to the benefit of the presumptions here
claimed until dispelled by evidence opposed to
the1n, and that it was for the jury to determine
whether the presumptions had been overcome

15
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by evidence offered in con traction thereof, and
which last-named evidence the court was not permitted to consider in ruling upon the motion for
a directed verdict.
"Cases cited by respondents in support of
their clain1 that the presumption is destroyed by
evidenee in contradietion thereof are all cases
where appeals were taken from final judgments,
in the rendition of which the court or jury was
entitled to pass upon the weight of all the evidence submitted and to judge of the credibility
of witnesses. Such power js not within the province of a court in ruling upon motions for non-suit
or directed verdict."

It will be noted that in many of the cases cited here-In actual eye-witnesses testified regarding conduct of
deceased which, if proven true, would definitely establish
contributory negligence. However, even under these circumstances the court entertains tha presumption and
allows the jury to determine if the evidence has been
sufficient to overcome it. In the case at hand there is no
evidence regarding decedent's actions and it is mere conjecture that he failed to stop or that he failed to see what
he should have seen. For this reason the court erred in
directing a verdict for the defendant.
IL THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING AVERDICT AGAINST PLAINTIFFS UPON THE GROUND THAT
DECEASED WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW, IN THAT CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY.

Even assuming that had Mr. Gibbs looked he would
have seen the approaching taxicab, it is strongly urged
16
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Ly appellants that the question of the deceased's contri-

butory negligence is one of fact and not one of law. The
most recent Utal1 pronouncement upon this problen1 appears to be contained within the case entitled Lowder v.
Holley (Utah-1951) :233 Pac. 2nd 350. In that case the
plaintiff and defendant collided in an open intersection
during the daytiiue. The negligence of the defendant
was clear but there 'vas mnple evidence that had the
plaintiff looked he would have seen the defendant and
hence he was contributorily negligent. The court stated
that it is true :
"That before entering an intersection the
driver of a car must look and determine whether
it is safe to enter. However, had plaintiff observed the truck (defendant's) just before he entered the intersection he would have been justified
in considering it safe to enter because at that point
the truck was being driven at the rate of fifty
Iniles per hour and plaintiff was driving at from
five to ten miles per hour ... then the truck would
have been at least 250 feet from the intersection
since his car had traveled almost the entire distance across the intersection before the impact,
and this being so, he could have assumed and acted
under the assu1nption that the driver of the truck
would exercise ordinary and reasonable care in
his driving and that it would be safe to cross the
intersection. Had defendant exercised such reasonable and ordinary care, the collision would not
have occurred. Under such state of facts plaintiff's failure to see the truck would in no way have
contributed to the accident. The Court therefore
did not err in finding that plaintiff was not contributorily negligent."
17
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It is urged in the case herein that had deceased observed defendant's taxicab, because of the great disparity
in speed between these two vehicle~, he woul~ have been
justified in considering it safe to enter the intersection.
In any event the Lowder ca~e states that whether or no
he acted as a reasonable nmn in entering the intersection
after having seen the approaching danger was a question
within the province of the jury. This is so even though
the only reasonable inference to be drawn from all of
the evidence is that had plaintiff looked he would have
seen.
The case at bar however is even stronger than the
Lowder case as several inferences regarding lookout
1night reasonably have been drawn hy the jury from all
the evidence. It might well have been inferred that deceased looked and could not see, or that he saw and, as a
reasonable man, misjudged the danger. The trial court
therefore comn1itted error in taking this vital factual
issue from the determination of the jury.
The general doctrine of the Lowder case is reannounced in a more recent Utah case, Compton v. Ogden
Union Railway Co., (Supra):
"Only in a clear case, where all reasonable
1ninds agree, should the issue of contributory
negligence be taken fron1 the jury."
The doctrine of the Lowder case is not novel to
Utah. It was earlier announced in the following cases:
Spackman v. Carson, (Utah-1950) 216 Pac. 2nd 640,
Nielson v. Manchley (Utah-194.9) 202 Pac. 2nd 547, Hun18
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ter v. Jlichaelis (Utah-1948) 198 Pac ..2nd 245, and Martin
v. Sheffield, 11.2 Uta.h 478, 189 Pac. 2nd 1.'!7.

It is true that the fact situation in n1ost of the above
cases are not identical with the Lowder case or the case
before this court. However, in the forgotten case of
Jlartin v. Sheffield, (Supt·a), which opinion has apparently not been cited since, the fact situation was
very close to the case before this Court. There was an
additional eleinent of contributory negligence evidenced
in that there was testiinony that the plaintiff did not look
at all upon entering the intersection. Nevertheless, the
unaniinous court held that the question of contributory
negligence is a jury problem.
In the case of Hunter v. Michaelis (Supra), a pedestrian was struck while crossing Wilshire Boulevard in
Los Angeles, California, in the night-time. Though it is
true the Utah Supreme Court applied California substantive law in deciding this case, it nevertheless held that
there was no contributory negligence as a matter of law
for the pedestrian's failure to see.

It appears that the rule of law announced in the
Lowder case is also the rule of law in Colorado, Kansas,
California, New lliexico, Oregon, Washington, Idaho and
Montana.
In the case of Lawrence v. Kansas City Power &
Light Co., et al, 167 Kan. 4.5, 204 Pac. 2nd 752,
the plaintiff and defendant collided in an open intersection, after the plaintiff had pre-empted the intersection.
The Supreme Court of Kansas stated:
19
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"Before a court can rule as a matter of law
that negligence has been established, the evidence
should be so clear that reasonable minds could
have but one opinion, nan1ely: that the party was
negligent. r_rhe question whether the auto driver
was contributorily negligent in proceeding across
the intersection after seeing the bus was· for the
jury, and the jury might well have found the acts
of the defendant to be the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injury-i.e.-defendant not watching
enough to know whether plaintiff was in the intersection."
This opinion was rendered by the Kansas Supreme Court
after the trial court had directed a verdict for the defendant upon the ground that plaintiff was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law.
In the case of JJfartin v. Harrison, 182 Ore. 121, 186
Pac. 2nd 534, the plaintiff, a pedestrian, was killed while
crossing a highway, not at a crosswalk. The Supreme
Court of Oregon stated:
"Contributory negligence becomes a question
of law only when frmu the facts reasonable men
can draw only one inference and that inference
points unerringly to negligence of plaintiff contributing to the injury, and in other cases the
question of contributory negligence is one of fact
for the jury. If a pedestrian crossing a street fail~
to look or looks straight ahead without glancing to either side ... he is guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law, but if he looks but
does not see approaching automobiles, or seeing
one, erroneously misjudges its speed or distance,
or for some other reason assumes he could avoid
injury to himself the question of contributory
negligence is for the jury."

20
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In the case of Prentis v. Joh1u-don, 119 Colo. 370, .203
Pac. :.!·nd 733, the plaintiff and defendant collided in an
open intersection and the Supren1e Court of Colorado
said:
"There is no contributory negligence as a
matter of law for failure to exercise due care because the plaintiff looked to the right and failed to
see, but the question of contributory negligence
is for the jury."
In the case of Stickel v. San Diego Electric Co. et
al, 32 Cal. (2d) 157, 195 Pac. 2nd 416, the plaintiff and
defendant collided in an intersection after the plaintiff
pulled into the intersection fron1 a stop sign. Th~ Court
held:
"The evidence was insufficient to establish as
a 1natter of law that plaintiff negligently failed to
yield the right of way and that such negligence
contributed to the collision. The jury could have
decided that when defendant started across the
intersection she reasonably believed that the bus
was not an immediate hazard."
In the case of Schoen v. Schroeder, 53 N. M. 1, 200
Pac. 2nd 1021, plaintiff and defendant collided in an
intersection after plaintiff had preempted. Held:
"The mere fact that plaintiff motorist drove
into the intersection from the left when defendant
was traveling down the street at some undisclosed
point on his right, did not establish as a tnatter
of law that plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence, although plaintiff did not see defendant when he looked in his direction."
In the case of Rios v. Bennett, (Supra), a
pedestrian was struck and killed at night while crossing
21
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a highway, though there was no evidence of whether
the pedestrian looked before stepping onto the highway.
The California Court stated:
"Whether a mistake in judgment by a pedestrian when crossing a street, as to speed and danger of approaching vehicles, constitutes contributory negligence is a question for the jury. As
there was no evidence whether the pedestrian
looked or not a presumption existed that he used
ordinary care for his own safety and that in doing
so he looked before he stepped out into the street/'
In the case of Warren v. Hynes, 4 Wash. (2d) 128,
102 Pac. 2nd 691, plaintiff had crossed the center Ilne of
an intersection after looking and not seeing and was
struck by the defendant approaching the intersection
at a ninety degree angle. The "\Vashington Court held:
"Whether plaintiff who looked to the left
when he was between 150 and 180 feet from the
intersection, saw no approaching auto, and did not
again look in that direction until his auto was in
the center of the intersection, was contributorily
negligent was for the jury."
In Wiswell v. Shinners, (Supra), the Court concludes:
"On the record presented to us herein, we feel
that the question whether decedent's behavior
and conduct, that is to say, whether he looked
and either did not see the approaching automobile,
or saw it and misjudged either its speed or distance, constituted contributory negligence under
the particular circumstances then existing, was
one of fact, as was also the question of whether

22
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decedent's conduct 1neasured up to the requirements of that of a reasonable man in complying
with the aforesaid Vehicle Code provision. The
question of contributory negligence is always one
of fact for the jury to decide under proper instructions, except in those cases in which, judged in
the light of con1mon knowledge and experience,
there is a standard of prudence to which all persons silnilarly situated must confonn. It is only
in these last-nan1ed cases that failure to adhere
to that conunon standard is as a n1atter of law
contributory negligence. Where different conclusions n1ay reasonably be drawn by different
minds fron1 the same evidence, the decision must
be left to the triers of fact. Therefore, under the
facts and circumstances here present, the questions of the negligence of the defendant and the
contributory negligence of the deceased, as well
as the important question of proximate cause,
were all for the jury to determine in the light of
all the facts, circumstances and presumptions presented by the evidence.
"It should be understood that throughout this
opinion we have followed the rule applicable to
cases where the appeal is taken from a judgment
following a directed verdict or non-suit, which rule
requires that evidence, and presumptions as a
species of evidence, shall be taken by the appellate
tribunal in the light most favorable to the losing
party in the court below. We are therefore expressing no opinion as to the weight of the evidence or its truth or falsity."
In the case entitled Flynn v. Helena Cab & Bus Co.,
94 Mont. 204, 21 Pac. 2nd 1105, plaintiff proceeding at
12 miles per hour, saw defendant, proceeding at 40 miles
per hour some distance fron1 intersection, but neverthe-
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less entered the intersection and was struck. The court
stated:
"Plaintiff seeing defendant, approaching
street intersection fron1 right, travel 150 ft. while
plaintiff went 40 feet not contributorily negligent
as a nmtter of law in proceeding forward when
defendant was 150ft. away."
See also Maier et al v. 1lfinidoka County Motor Co.,
et al61 Ida. 642,105 Pac. 2nd 1076.
It should be noted that many of the above cases involved fact situations wherein there was considerable
evidence of plaintiff's failure to exercise due care in his
own behalf. In the case at bar, however, the sole factual
basis of the legal deter1nination of decedent's contributory negligence was the inference from the physical
facts that had he looked he would have seen the appro_aching taxicab.
It is respectfully urged, therefore, by virtue of the
above authority, that the trial court committed error.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A
VERDICT AGAINST PLAINTIFFS UPON THE GROUND
THAT DECEASED WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW, AS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER
OR NO DECEASED'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, IF
ANY, PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTED TO HIS DEATH
WAS AN ISSUE OFF ACT FOR THE JURY.

It is appellants' futher contention that, under the
facts of this case, the proximate cause of the death of F.
Parley Gibbs was a question for the jury and that it con-
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stituted error for the trial court to direct a verdict
against the plaintiffs.
In the case of Greenfield v. Br·uskas, 41 N. M. 346,
68 Pac. 2nd 921 at page 926, proxin1ate cause was defined

as follows:
"Proximate cause is an ultimate fact and is
usually an inference to be drawn by the jury from
the facts proved, and only becomes a question of
law when the facts regarding causation are undisputed and all reasonable inferences that can be
drawn therefrmn are plain, consistent and uncontradictory."
The leading case in Utah dealing with causation is
that of Hess v. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 Pac. 2nd 510,
and in that case the trial court held that both the plaintiff
and the defendant were negligent as a Inatter of law but
submitted to the jury the question of proximate cause.
A verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed on appeal. The
dissenting opinion in the case of Hickock v. Skinner, 113
Utah 1, 190Pac. 2nd 514, said the following with respect
to Hess v. Robinson :
"Even if it be conceded that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, the question of whether or not such negligence was a substantial causative factor in producing the collision
was one of fact. Even if plaintiff had taken a
second or third look, such might not have revealed
to him that defendant would not yield the right-ofway to hiin, until too late for plaintiff to avert the
accident. This case is somewhat similar to Hess
v. Robinson. In that case plaintiff was driving
25
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on a through highwa~· and did not see defendant'~
ambulance approaching from the right. The ambulance went through the stop sign and crashed
into plaintiff's autmnobile. The trial court held
both parties negligent as a matter of law, but submitted the case to the jury on the question of
whether or not plaintiff's contributory negligence
was a proximate cause of the damage. From a
verdict and judgment for plajntiff, defendants
appealed. We affirmed. Although this court divided on the question of whether or not plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law, we agreed unanimously that the question
of proximate cause was one for the jury. I recognize that the facts of this case are somewhat different frmn those in the Hess case, but the underlying reasoning should be the same.
In the case of Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey, 61 Utah
465, 214 Pac. 304, the trial court refused to give the fol-

lowing instructions as requested by the plaintiff:
"You are instructed that it is negligence as a
matter of law for a person to drive an automobile
upon a traveled public highway, used by vehicles
and pedestrians, at such a rate of speed that said
automobile cannot be stopped within the distance
at which the operator of said car is able to see objects on the highway in front of him."
This refusal was held error on appeal. However, in
the recent case of Wright v. 111aynard (Utah-1951), :235
Pac. 2nd 916, the validity of the foregoing rule of law
was affinned but it was held that the question of proximate cause was a question for the jury.
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In the case of Styris v. Folk, 62 Nev. 209, 146 Pac.
2-nd 782, the plaintiff, a pedestrian, was struck by the
defendant, a 1notorist, while crossing the street in the
middle of the block in violation of a city ordinance. The
Court at page 786 of the Pacific Reporter says:
"Appellant's contention that the continual
negligence rule should apply because of the violation of the ordinance, cannot be allowed. That
rule, like the rule requiring actual knowledge of
peril, is too harsh to be consonant with justice.
As stated in Yellow Cab Corporation v. !-lenderson, supra (178 Va. 207, 16 S. E. 2nd 393): 'The
antecedent negligence of a plaintiff does not of
itself preclude his recovery. Starkly stated, the
reason for the rule is this: One cannot kill another
1nerely because he is negligent.'
'• In other words, a drunken or speedy motorist may not run down a careless pedestrian with
impunity.
"There is no difference in principle as to the
effect of negligence whether arising by violation
of an ordinance, or by ordinary negligence. In
either instance, whether it is the remote or proxinlate cause of an accident, is a question of fact
in each particular case ... Although, as to the former, the negligence is presumed as a matter of
law, yet whether it is the proximate cause of· an
accident is always a matter of fact. Smith v. Zone
Cabs, 135 Ohio St. 415, 21 N.E. 2d 336, 338. In
that case, in which the violation of an ordinance
was involved, the court said: 'However, the negligence which the law attributes to appellant is not,
in and of itself, sufficient to preclude his recovery.
To operate as a bar, his negligence must be shown
as a n1atter of fact to have had a causal relation
27
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to and connection with his injuries. In other
words, the negligence which the law here attributes to appellant must be shown to have been the
proximate cause of his injuries. Negligence per se
and proximate cause are two separate and distinct
issues. "\Vhile one is presumed as a matter of law,
the other must nevertheless, be proved as a matter
of fact. Although appellant crossed the street between intersections, in violation of an ordinance,
he cannot be held as a matter of law to have reasonably apprehended that in so doing injury would
result. Even to a pedestrian, thus crossing, a
motorist owes the duty of exercising ordinary
care. It is true that such ordinance gives to a
motorist the right of way between intersections.
However, that right is not absolute but preferential only, and the motorist is not absolved from
his duty of exercising ordinary care for the safety
of pedestrians, rightfully or wrongfully on the
highway between such intersections. Whether the
cab driver in the instant case exercised such care
was a question of fact for the jury.'"
We have found three recent Kansas cases, namely,
Baker vs. Western Casualty d!; Surety Co., 164 Kan. 376,
190 Pac. 2nd 850, Atkins vs. illorton, 164 Kan. 626, 191
Pac. 2nd 909, and Lawrence ~;:-;. Kansas Power & Light
Co., (Supra), and in each of these cases the question of
proximate cause was held to be a jury question. In a
recent Colorado case, Amos vs. Remington Arms Co., 117
Colo. 399, 188 Pac. 2nd 896, a directed verdict for the
defendant was reversed on the ground that proximate
cause was a question for the jury. In three recent cases
decided by the California Appellate Court, namely,
Douglas vs. Hoff, 82 Cal. App. (2d) 8:2, 185 Pac. 2nd 607,
~8
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and Green vs. Uarte, 87 Cal. App. (.2d) 7•j, 196 Pac. 2nd
63 and Wiswell vs. Sh-inners (Supra), a directed verdict,

a non-suit, and a directed verdict respectively, for the
defendants involved were reversed and the question of
proximate cause was held to be a question for the jury.
To the same effect were the cases of Chavez vs. Worley,
a New :Mexico case, found at 48 N. J.lf. 449, 152 Pac. 2nd
393, and Carlson 'US. Whelan, a vVashington case, 197
Wash. 104, 84 Pac. 2nd 1001.
In the case of Genola vs. Barrett, 14 Cal. (2d) 217,
93 Pac. 2nd 109, the Supreme Court of California, in a
case involving a pedestrian and an aut01nobile where
the pedestrian was crossing in violation of an ordinance,
stated:
"Not only did the trial court hold in the case
at bar, as a matter of law, that plaintiff was contributorily negligent, but that her negligence, was,
per se, the proximate cause of her injury. Here,
plaintiff was standing in the street, according to
one eye-witness, about ten or twelve seconds. She
then stepped back, at which tilne the car was not
within an approximate eighty-foot range of vision
of the witness. When defendant failed to see what
was plainly visible, failed to slacken her speed,
and failed to swerve her car a few inches to avoid
striking plaintiff who had yielded the right of
way, it cannot be said that, as a matter of law, the
negligence of plaintiff was the proximate cause of
her injury."
And, in the case of Young vs. Boy Scouts of America, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 760, 51 Pac. 2nd 191, the Court said:

29
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"Whether or not the 1ninor plaintiff, in riding
his bicycle after dark without a light, was guilty
of contributory negligence which was a proximate
eause of his injuries was also a question of fact
and not one of law."
The case of JJlaier et al v. Minidoka County Motor
Co., (Stttpra), involved a bicycle, with no headlight but
with a rear reflector, that was struck from the rear at
night by an automobile. The Supreme Court of Idaho
held that the questions of negligence, contributory negligence and proxi1nate cause were all properly for the
jury.
In Briggs vs. United Fruit & Produce Inc., 11 Wash.
(2d) 466, 119 Pac. 2nd 687, a bicycle with both a headlight.
and a reflector, was struck from behind at night by a
truck, and there it was contended that the bicycle was
near the center of the road rather than on the side. The
Court held that contributory negligence and proximate
cause were jury questions.
And, in Pollard 'CS. Wittman, 28 Wash. (2d) 367,183
Pac. 2nd 175, a ·n10torcycle without lights was involved
in an accident with a n1otorist crossing into the wrong
lane. The court held that the proximate cause of the
accident should be submitted to the jury.
The Supreme Court of California, 1n the case of
llart v. Farris, 218 Cal. 69, 21 Pac. 2nd 432, at page 433,
makes the following statement:

"It was admitted that the bicycle carried no
light at all. Appellants contend that such fact
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establishes negligence per se upon the plaintiff's
part barring recovery. A violation of the provisions of the statute by plaintiff would not bar
her fron1 recovery on the ground of contributory
negligence unless such violation of law proximately contributed to the accident. • • • Presunlably the jury concluded that, in view of the
lack of attention of the driver of the automobile
to the road ahead and the good light which the
headlights of the automobile reflected ahead for
a distance of 300 feet, the absence of lights on
the bicycle was not a contributing factor in the
accident. Such was the. view of the trial court
as expressed in denying appellants' motion for a
new trial. Such a conclusion had mnple support
in evidence."

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred
m directing a verdict in favor of the respondent and
against the appellants for the reasons that the presumption of due care on the part of appellants' deceased was
not overcome, and whether he was guilty of contributory
negligence or not was a question for the jury as well as
the question of proxinmte causation. The trial court
inferred that said deceased either did not look or looking, did not see what he should have seen. "\Ve contend
that that is not the only reasonable inference that can
be drawn. It is just as reasonable to infer that he looked
and saw and n1isjudged the distance and speed of the
taxicab. It is also a perfectly proper inference that the
deceased entered the intersection long before the taxicab
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was in view, and for Home reaHon \\'as still in the inter~eetion when the taxicab Htruck hilu. vVe Inaintain that
the reasonable inferences that can he drawn from the
facts of this caHe regarding causation are not plain, con~i~tent and uncontradictory, but, on the contrary are
inconsistent and contradictory, and upon proper instruction becmne i:-;sues of fact that could only be decided by
the jury.
Respectfully submitted,

HEBER GRANT IVINS,
ROBER'r B. PORTER, JR.,
DELBERT ~I. DRAPER, Jr.,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
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